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Abstract
Automated market makers, first popularized by Hanson’s logarithmic market scor-
ing rule (or LMSR) for prediction markets, have become important building blocks,
called ‘primitives,’ for decentralized finance. A particularly useful primitive is the
ability to measure the price of an asset, a problem often known as the pricing oracle
problem. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of a very large class of automated
market makers, called constant function market makers (or CFMMs) which includes
existing popular market makers such as Uniswap, Balancer, and Curve, whose yearly
transaction volume totals to billions of dollars. We give sufficient conditions such that,
under fairly general assumptions, agents who interact with these constant function
market makers are incentivized to correctly report the price of an asset and that they
can do so in a computationally efficient way. We also derive several other useful prop-
erties that were previously not known. These include lower bounds on the total value
of assets held by CFMMs and lower bounds guaranteeing that no agent can, by any
set of trades, drain the reserves of assets held by a given CFMM.
1 Introduction
As natively digital assets continue to grow, there is an increasing need for mechanisms
of exchange similar to those found in traditional financial markets. These digital assets,
which include online ad impressions, cryptocurrencies, and prediction market bets, are often
complex to interact with and suffer from low liquidity [1]. Over the last decade, a number of
designs for automated market makers (AMMs) have been proposed to reduce this complexity.
AMMs encourage passive market participants with low time preference to lend their digital
assets to asset pools. The assets are then priced via a scoring rule which maps the current
pool sizes to a marginal price. One of the most popular scoring rules is Hanson’s logarithmic
market scoring rule (LMSR) [2]. This rule has been implemented in numerous online settings
including online ad auctions [3], prediction markets [4, 5], and instructor rating markets [6].
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Recently, the cryptocurrency community has constructed alternative automated market
makers to the LMSR (and its counterparts), known as the constant function market makers
(CFMMs). Examples of CFMMs include Uniswap’s constant product AMM [7] and the con-
stant mean AMM [8]. Most applications of CFMMs have been to construct decentralized
exchanges, which allow for the exchange of security-like assets without the need for a trusted
third-party. One main concern for users of these markets is whether prices on decentralized
exchanges accurately follow those on centralized exchanges, which currently have more liq-
uidity. If the price of a decentralized exchange prices matches external prices, then such an
exchange is said to be a good price oracle that other smart contracts can query as a source
of ground truth.
The oracle problem. Of the AMM use-cases, prediction markets are the most studied
and likely most controversial applications of markets implementing the LMSR. As prediction
markets have repeatedly been shut down or discontinued due to intervention by governments,
large-scale stress testing of these mechanisms has been limited [9]. The advent of smart
contract systems, such as Ethereum [10] and Tezos [11], has allowed for the design and
implementation of decentralized and censorship resistant versions of prediction markets. In
particular, Augur [12] and Gnosis [4] are smart contracts that implement LMSR-AMMs that
are deployed to Ethereum’s live network. This means that anyone who owns Ethereum’s
native asset (ETH) can participate in these prediction markets and bet without the risk
of government intervention and asset seizure (e.g., akin to ‘Black Friday’ within the online
poker community [13]).
However, the main difficulty in using these systems in the decentralized setting is the
ability to query data external to the smart contract. For example, a prediction market
betting on the future weather in Seattle would need to know the resulting weather report,
once the event has happened. Doing this in a trustless manner is difficult, as participants
who have a losing bet are encouraged to try to dupe the smart contract, i.e., to manipulate
the response of the contract’s query. In our previous example, if the prediction market
bets on the question “will the weather in Seattle be greater than 25◦C?” then a malicious
participant with an active bet on “no” is incentivized to manipulate the query response to
say that the temperature is less than 25◦C. In the cryptocurrency community, the problem
of providing external data to a blockchain is known as the oracle problem, as an homage to
oracles queried in theoretical computer science [14].
Decentralized oracles. Formally, an oracle refers to any computational device that pro-
vides the smart contract data external to the underlying blockchain [12]. There are two types
of oracles in smart contract prediction markets: centralized and decentralized. Centralized
oracles involve a trusted individual or organization that provides data to the smart contract.
Examples of centralized oracles include Provable/Oraclize [16, 15], Wolfram Alpha [18], and
the MakerDAO oracle [19]. If these oracles are used to decide on LMSR prediction market
events, they still rely on participants trusting that the centralized authority will not manip-
ulate the data determining the final outcome of the market. For highly valuable markets,
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such as the prediction of the US presidential election, it is usually untenable to trust a single
individual or organization and one defers to decentralized oracles.
Decentralized oracles are smart contracts that rely on users voting on particular predic-
tion market outcomes. A final outcome is chosen via a social choice function [20], similar
to how majority or weighted majority voting is used to decide outcomes in elections. In the
case of smart contracts, the social choice function is usually significantly more complicated as
the voting mechanism needs to account for adverse selection, bribery, and collusion amongst
voters. In order to reduce the likelihood of such oracle manipulation, decentralized oracle
designs often have exit games and/or complicated multiparty games that allow for certain
users to challenge votes that they dispute. Moreover, to encourage a large swath of potential
users to participate in a vote, prediction market smart contracts usually provide users with
a reward. This reward is disbursed in a manner similar to how cryptocurrency rewards are
given to miners and/or validators [21]. These oracles are difficult to design as one has to
balance mechanism complexity with provable defenses against collusion between prediction
market participants. Examples of decentralized oracles include Augur, Astraea [22], Gnosis,
and UMA [23]. We note that a stated design goal of Augur is for the prices implied by the
LMSR to be used as an oracle input into other smart contracts. For instance, if another
smart contract relies on the probability of whether Seattle’s temperature is greater or less
than 25◦C, then that contract simply has to subscribe to the data and pricing provided by
an Augur market. In this way, prediction market smart contracts aim to serve as the single
source of off-chain data that is accessible to an arbitrarily large number of on-chain smart
contracts.
Decentralized exchanges. Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) provide a method for par-
ticipants to trade pairs of on-chain assets without ever needing to trust a centralized author-
ity [24, 25], while additionally providing a means for measuring the relative price of this pair
of assets. (For example, one simple but effective way in which these exchanges can provide a
price would be to report the price at which the last trade was executed.) Currently, there are
roughly $100 million of digital assets locked in DEXs with trading volume often surpassing
$10 million per day [26, 27]. A design for a secure decentralized exchange for cryptocurren-
cies has been desired almost since the advent of Bitcoin, since centralized exchanges such as
Mt. Gox [28], Quadriga [29], and Bitfinex [30] have had catastrophic losses that aggregate
to billions of dollars of depositors’ funds.
Many decentralized exchanges have been proposed, each with specific trading and pricing
mechanisms. These range from classic order book mechanisms [24] to other, more compli-
cated cases [31]. Yet, Uniswap [7, 32, 33], an AMM whose pricing mechanism for comparing
two assets is relatively simple in both theory and practice, has become an extraordinar-
ily popular decentralized exchange, as measured by total trading volumes and total funds
in their reserves [27]. This has led other protocols such as Celo [34] to use the Uniswap
mechanism as a price oracle.
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Figure 1: Market sizes of protocols utilizing constant function market makers (in red) and LMSR-
based AMMs (in blue) on February 12, 2020. There are $129.7 million of digital assets held by
CFMM contracts and $0.721 million of assets held by LMSR-based market makers. Data taken
from DeFi Pulse [26].
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Generalizations of Uniswap. The success of Uniswap, which required far fewer resources
to develop than competing decentralized exchanges1 has led to a number of generalizations.
A natural first question is whether the Uniswap constant product formula is optimal for all
types of assets. For instance, a pair of assets which have a common mean price but different
volatilities can incur large losses for the corresponding market makers and liquidity providers
at specific instances in time.
An example of such assets are stablecoins, which are digital assets whose value is (ap-
proximately) pegged to be equal to $1. The price of these assets naturally fluctuate around
$1 USD, but tend to stay within a bounded range of [1− , 1 + ] for some  > 0. The fluc-
tuations of these assets is dictated by their natural sources of demand and can vary greatly,
even though these digital assets are all meant to represent the same real world asset. For
instance, a stablecoin that is popular in Venezuela will likely have different demand char-
acteristics than one that is popular in China. In order to incentivize traders, the trading
mechanism should instead charge lower fees when two stablecoins are near $1 USD and higher
fees when the stablecoins are farther from $1 USD. This approach has been implemented in
Curve (previously known as StableSwap) [39], which ensures that the trading prices around
$1 USD are relatively small, but quickly becomes expensive as coins trade away from one
another.
Multi-coin generalizations. Another generalization of the Uniswap mechanism involves
pricing multiple assets simultaneously. Instead of providing a scoring rule that is a function
of the quantities of two assets, these scoring rules take are able to price m assets in terms
of a set of n other assets. This allows for users to exchange portfolios of assets for other
portfolios, reducing the number of transactions that the network has to handle. On an
exchange that only allows for pairwise trades, a participant would need to do m trades to a
nume´raire asset (e.g., Bitcoin or USD) and then n trades from the nume´raire to the output
assets. Multi-asset generalizations of Uniswap, such as Balancer [8], would execute such a
trade atomically, reducing fees and price slippage. The choice of scoring rule affects how
easy it is for arbitrageurs to keep the portfolio prices synchronized with the prices of the
underlying components.
While this mechanism might seem arbitrary, there are a number of examples of similar
assets from traditional finance that involve trading baskets of good for other baskets of
goods. For instance, an Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) is a single equity instrument SE that
represents a weighted set of shares S1, . . . , Sn. There are currently over $5 trillion of assets
locked in ETFs [40]. Many ETFs represent a share of SE by a weighted linear combination
of the shares, SE =
∑n
i=1wiSi for some positive integer weights wi. If any of the prices
of shares Si change, leaving SE mispriced, an arbitrageur can perform creation-redemption
1Uniswap was created with a $100,000 grant from the Ethereum Foundation [32], whereas 0x [35] and
Bancor raised $24 million and $153 million in Initial Coin Offerings, respectively. On-chain data provider
Dune Analytics reports that Uniswap had $370,703,652 of volume in 2019, whereas 0x had $228,271,968 of
volume and Bancor had $154,427,142 of volume [36, 37]. Note that na¨ıvely comparing liquidity (as oppposed
to volume) is more involved, as 0x currently routes orders to Uniswap and a number of aggregators exist
that partition orders between different exchanges [38].
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arbitrage [41]. This arbitrage works due to two steps:
• Creation: A market participant can create a single share SE by providing the ETF
underwriter with wi shares of Si for all i
• Redemption: A market participant can redeem a single share SE by giving the ETF
underwriter SE and receiving {wiSi : i ∈ [n]}.
If the price of SE is higher than the weighted sum of the prices of Si, then an arbitrageur can
buy the basket {wiSi : i ∈ [n]} for less than price(SE), create a share of SE and sell it for a
profit of price(SE)−
∑n
i=1wi · price(Si). Similarly, the arbitrageur can use a redemption to
arbitrage a low SE price. Multi-asset generalizations of Uniswap allow for precisely this type
of arbitrage to occur without the need for a trusted intermediary (e.g., the ETF underwriter).
Summary. In this paper, we show that many of the generalizations presented are special
cases of a large family of constant function market makers, or CFMMs, which all satisfy
relatively similar and useful theoretical properties, under mild conditions. In particular,
we give a complete and very general framework for analyzing CFMMs that includes all of
the examples of CFMMs currently used in practice. We also provide sufficient conditions
for these CFMMs to be well-behaved, in the sense that (a) agents are incentivized to have
the CFMM correctly report the price of its assets, when compared to a reference market,
and (b) agents can never drain the assets that a CFMM contains by only trading with the
given CFMM. Additionally, we give some simple derivations of a few properties of interest,
including the total asset value that a given CFMM holds, as a function of the external market
prices. Finally, we provide some simple extensions of the current analysis and possible future
directions for a more general analysis of CFMMs.
2 Constant function market makers
In this section, we will discuss the basic definitions of constant function market makers and
how Uniswap, among other CFMMs, fit directly into the provided framework.
Definition of a CFMM. A constant function market maker, or CFMM, is a type of
automated market maker defined by its trading function, ϕ : Rn+ ×Rn+ ×Rn+ → R, and its
reserves, R ∈ Rn+. Here, Ri specifies how much of coin i the CFMM is allowed to use or
interact with, while the trading function specifies what constitutes a valid trade.
In all of the applications we will see, a decentralized smart contract will implement a given
CFMM. In this scenario, the CFMM will have some balance of various tokens available to it
(with the ith entry of the reserves vector R specifying the amount of token i that is available),
and agents can interact with this CFMM in various ways.
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Agents and actions. In one case, a liquidity provider provides some number of funds to
the reserves of the contract. In return, the liquidity provider is given a form of IOU (usually
in the form of other tokens) which can be later redeemed for some fixed percentage of the
reserve amounts.
In contrast, a trader attempts to exchange some given amount of coins in reserves. For
example, a trader may simply want to trade some amount of coin i for coin j, in which
case the trader would deposit some amount of coin i into the reserves of the contract and
withdraw some amount of coin j from these reserves.
The trading function. More generally, a trader may wish to trade any number of coins
for any other coins in potentially very complicated ways. To specify this, we will write the
output trade, Λ ∈ Rn+, as a vector with n nonnegative entries. (We will often simply call this
the output.) The output’s ith entry, Λi, specifies how much of coin i the trader wishes to
receive from the CFMM. Additionally, we will define the input ∆ ∈ Rn+, which is a vector
whose ith entry, ∆i specifies how much of coin i the trader has given the contract. We will
call the resulting tuple, (∆,Λ) ∈ Rn+ ×Rn+, a trade.
The trading function ϕ then specifies exactly when a trade is considered valid and there-
fore executed. In particular, the smart contract with reserves R only accepts the trade given
by (∆,Λ) whenever (∆,Λ) satisfies
ϕ(R,∆,Λ) = ϕ(R, 0, 0). (1)
In other words, the trade is accepted only if the trading function is kept constant. The
contract then places the coins ∆ provided by the trader into its reserves while paying out Λ
to the trader. This results in the reserves being updated in the following way:
R← R + ∆− Λ,
after a valid trade is executed.
Examples. Throughout the remainder of this paper, we will use constant product mar-
kets (Uniswap) and constant mean markets (Balancer) as mathematically simple but very
practical and useful instances of CFMMs and as the canonical examples for the definitions
and derivations provided.
In the case of constant product markets with percentage fee (1− γ) (see, e.g., [33, §2]),
we have n = 2 and the trading function is:
ϕ(R,∆,Λ) = (R1 + γ∆1 − Λ1)(R2 + γ∆2 − Λ2). (2)
Of course, no rational trader will ever opt to make both ∆1 6= 0 and Λ1 6= 0 in the case of
nonzero fees; i.e., a rational trader will never trade a specific coin for a smaller amount of the
same coin. The same is true for the pair ∆2 and Λ2. This results in the more recognizable
form:
ϕ(R,∆,Λ) =

(R1 + γ∆1)(R2 − Λ2) ∆2 = Λ1 = 0
(R1 − Λ1)(R2 + γ∆2) ∆1 = Λ2 = 0
ϕ(R, 0, 0) + ε otherwise.
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(One can make a similar argument in the fee-less case with γ = 1.) Here, ε 6= 0 can be any
nonzero value, as it should simply prevent any trade which has both Λ1 and ∆1 nonzero or
Λ2 and ∆2 nonzero, such that (1) cannot be satisfied in either of these cases. Throughout
the rest of this paper, we will work with the form given by (2), since the construction is
easier to handle mathematically, but both forms are easily seen to be equivalent in the sense
described in §2.1
The CFMM for constant mean markets, originally proposed by Balancer [8] for n coins
is (cf., [33, §3]):
ϕ(R,∆,Λ) =
n∏
i=1
(Ri + γ∆i − Λi)wi . (3)
Here, 0 < γ ≤ 1 and the weights w ∈ Rn+ are nonnegative and satisfy 1Tw = 1. As before,
no rational trader will have ∆i 6= 0 and Λi 6= 0 if γ < 1, and we can always take at least one
of these to be zero for any trade, even when γ = 1.
2.1 The trading set and implications
There are potentially many trading functions ϕ which are all ‘equivalent’ in some sense or
another. One example is to compare the functions ϕ and −ϕ. Clearly, any trade which is
feasible in one CFMM is feasible in the other, yet the functions are not equal except when
both take on the value 0.
To fix this issue, we introduce the trading set T (R) ⊆ Rn+×Rn+ at reserves R, defined as
T (R) = {(∆,Λ) | ϕ(R,∆′,Λ′) = 0 for some ∆′ ≤ ∆, Λ′ ≥ Λ}, (4)
where the inequalities are all taken elementwise. Another way of stating this definition is the
following: the trade (∆,Λ) ∈ T (R) is in the trading set only when there exists a (potentially)
cheaper alternative ∆′ ≤ ∆, or one with (potentially) higher payoff, Λ′ ≥ Λ.
The general idea is that no rational agent will ever pick a trade (∆,Λ) ∈ T (R) whenever
there exists a better trade (∆′,Λ′) satisfying ∆′ ≤ ∆ and Λ′ ≥ Λ with at least one of the
elementwise inequalities holding strictly. We also note that this definition of a trading set is
similar in spirit to the idea of an epigraph in optimization theory [42, §3.1.7].
The trading set contains all of the important information provided by the trading function
ϕ, for a given CFMM. Because of this, we will often opt to work with the trading set instead
of the function ϕ directly, as working with the set is generally mathematically simpler and
more elegant. In many (but not all) cases, the statements for the trading set can easily
be translated to statements over the function ϕ. When this is the case, we will write both
statements directly.
Feasibility and equivalence. We will say some trade (∆,Λ) is feasible if (∆,Λ) ∈ T (R)
and define two CFMMs to be equivalent if their trading sets are equal (i.e., if the same trades
are feasible in both). The main idea is that the definition of T is essentially unique with
respect to the actions that any rational agent would take. More specifically, if two trading
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sets are not equal T (R) 6= T ′(R) for some reserves R, say, then there exists a trade in one
set which is not feasible in the other; in other words, at least one trade (∆,Λ) ∈ T (R) is not
in T ′(R) and there exists no trade dominating (∆,Λ) in either set.
An interesting and surprising consequence of this definition is that, given any trading
function ϕ, we can construct an equivalent CFMM with trading function ϕ′ such that
ϕ′(R, ·, ·) is monotonically nonincreasing in its first argument and nondecreasing in its sec-
ond. We show this and discuss some additional implications in §A.1.
Equivalence in practice. The trading set for a constant mean market (3) can easily be
written as the set of all nonnegative (∆,Λ) that satisfy
n∏
i=1
(Ri + γ∆i − Λi)wi ≥
n∏
i=1
Rwii .
If we were to take n = 2 and w1 = w2 = 1/2, then the trading set is the set of all nonnegative
(∆,Λ) that satisfy
(R1 + γ∆1 − Λ1)1/2(R2 + γ∆2 − Λ2)1/2 ≥ R1/21 R1/22 .
Squaring both sides of the inequality, as both quantities are nonnegative, gives exactly the
equation for the trading set for the constant product market (2) for any possible reserve
vector R and fee γ ≤ 1. This implies that the trading sets are equal, which, in turn, implies
the CFMMs are equivalent, as expected.
In fact, this case is the special case where the two trading functions are related by a
strictly monotonic transformation, so the two trading sets are obviously equivalent. (More
generally, the CFMMs with trading functions ϕ and f ◦ ϕ are equivalent for any invertible
transformation f : R→ R.) An enlightening exercise is to write two different, but equivalent,
trading functions for constant product and constant mean markets for which there exists no
invertible transformation mapping one to the other.
2.2 Convexity of the trading set
We will make only one assumption regarding the trading set T (R): for each possible reserve
vector R, the set T (R) is a closed convex set.
Discussion. This assumption of convexity has two important consequences. First, the
geometry of convex sets is an extremely well-studied and developed field, and many basic
results from this field suffice for the mathematical purposes of this paper, while remaining
considerably general. The second case is that, when the set T (R) can be written down in a
compact way (e.g., as the intersection of a polynomial number of well-known convex cones),
then we can usually solve convex optimization problems over this set in a computationally
efficient way [42, §1], even when closed-form solutions aren’t guaranteed to exist. As we will
show later in §2.4, this implies that agents can easily maximize their payoff by computing
an appropriate solution to an optimization problem over the trading set.
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Convexity in practice. So far, to the knowledge of the authors at the time of writing,
there is no CFMM used in practice whose trading set is nonconvex. For example, constant
mean market CFMMs have convex trading sets since the weighted geometric mean function
is a concave function, composition with an affine function preserves convexity, and the su-
perlevel sets of a concave function are convex (cf., [42, §3.1] for elementary proofs). This
implies that the trading set
T (R) = {(∆,Λ) ∈ Rn+ ×Rn+ |
∏n
i=1(Ri + ∆i − Λi)wi ≥
∏n
i=1R
wi
i },
is therefore a convex set, for any valid weights w ≥ 0 with 1Tw = 1 and reserves R. (This
also immediately shows that constant product markets have convex trading sets, as a special
case.)
For a more complicated example, we will consider the trading function for Curve [39]:
ϕ(R,∆,Λ) = α1T (R + γ∆− Λ)− β
n∏
i=1
(Ri + γ∆i − Λi)−1, (5)
where α, β ≥ 0 are tunable parameters, (1−γ) is the percentage fee, and, as usual, (∆,Λ) ∈
Rn+ × Rn+. We can show that the trading set is convex directly, since the function x 7→
−(∏ni=1 xi)−1 is a concave function that is increasing in each of its arguments. (A simple
proof follows from the fact that x 7→ log∏ni=1 x−1i is convex as it is the sum of negative
logarithms, and a function is convex if it is log-convex [42, §3.5.1].) Therefore, the set of all
(∆,Λ) satisfying
α1T (R + γ∆− Λ)− β
n∏
i=1
(Ri + γ∆i − Λi)−1 ≥ α1TR− β
n∏
i=1
R−1i ,
is, again, a convex set as it is the superlevel set of the sum of an affine and a concave function.
2.3 Path deficiency and path independence
There are many special CFMMs which, when appropriately generalized, yield a very natural
family of trading functions and sets worth studying. One particularly useful property that
makes the analysis of some CFMMs simpler is path independence. While practical CFMMs
usually don’t satisfy path independence (often owing to their fee structure), path independent
CFMMs often serve as a good starting point for reasoning about possible CFMMs and many
of the special cases we study will be path independent.
We note that, unlike in the classical automated market maker literature (where path
independence is almost a requirement), almost no CFMMs in practice are path independent.
Much of the theory presented here also does not require this property to hold except in specific
cases, and we will make explicit note of this when those results are presented. Because of this
we will present a slight generalization of path independence, called path deficiency, which
retains many of the useful properties but is satisfied by all known CFMMs used in practice.
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Figure 2: Example reachable set.
The reachable reserve set. The definitions of path deficiency and path independence
can be phrased in simple ways in terms of the reachable reserve set, defined, for fixed reserves
R ∈ Rn+, as
S(R) = {R + ∆− Λ | (∆,Λ) ∈ T (R)}. (6)
Equivalently, the reachable reserve set, S(R), is the set of reserves which can be reached from
the current CFMM reserves by performing a single feasible trade. Note that the set S(R) is
also convex as it is the image of T (R) under an affine transformation. The reachable reserve
set is shown in figure 2 for the case of constant product markets with reserves satisfying
R1R2 = 1 and no fees.
2.3.1 Path deficiency
We will say that a CFMM is path deficient if, for given reserves R, any reachable reserve
R′ ∈ S(R) has a reachable set satisfying S(R′) ⊆ S(R). In other words, performing any
feasible trade can only make the reachable reserve set no larger than its current one.
This has a very simple implication: any path deficient CFMM initialized with reserves
R0 will always satisfy
1TR ≥ inf
R′∈S(R0)
1TR′,
where R are the reserves after any number of feasible trades have been executed. This follows
from the fact that S(R) ⊆ S(R0), which generalizes the known lower bounds for the total
amount of coin in reserves for, e.g., constant product and constant mean market makers [33,
§2.3]. In other words, path deficiency guarantees that the reserves are always bounded from
below after any set of trades has been performed.
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Figure 3: Example reachable sets of a (strictly) path-deficient CFMM after two trades.
Strict path deficiency. Additionally, we will say that a CFMM is strictly path deficient
if R′ ∈ S(R) implies that S(R′) ⊆ dintS(R), where dintS(R) is the dominated interior of
S(R), defined as
dintS(R) = {R′ ∈ S(R) | R′ dominates some element in S(R)}.
For two nonnegative vectors, x, y ∈ Rn+, we say x dominates y if x ≥ y and at least one of
the inequalities holds strictly. Clearly, a strictly path deficient CFMM is path deficient, but
not vice versa. Additionally, note that relintS(R) ⊆ dintS(R), where relintS(R) is the
relative interior [42, §2.1.3] of S(R). See, e.g., figure 3 for an example.
The main idea of strict path deficiency is to note that any agent will always prefer to
make a trade such that the new CFMM reserves satisfy R′ ∈ S(R) \ dintS(R) to a trade
which changes the CFMM reserves to R′ ∈ dintS(R), since, by definition, R′ ∈ dintS(R)
implies that the agent either received strictly less output or had to add in strictly more input
than at least one possible feasible trade in S(R).
Sufficient condition. A simple but very useful sufficient condition for strict path defi-
ciency is that a CFMM is path deficient if we can write its trading set in the following
form:
T (R) = {(∆,Λ) ∈ Rn+ ×Rn+ | ψ(R + γ∆− Λ) ≥ ψ(R)},
where 0 ≤ γ < 1 and ψ is a quasiconcave function that is strictly increasing in its arguments.
(For more information on quasiconcave functions, see, e.g., [43].) A quick sketch of the proof
is to note that R + ∆ − Λ dominates R + γ∆ − Λ in at least one entry if ∆ 6= 0. Because
the function is strictly increasing, then
ψ(R + ∆− Λ) > ψ(R + γ∆− Λ) ≥ ψ(R),
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which gives the result after using the definition of the reachable reserve set (6) and using
the fact that ψ(R′) > ψ(R) and R′ ≥ R implies that R′ dominates R.
This provides a much simpler proof of path deficiency than the one given in appendix D
of [33] for constant product markets, and this sufficient condition covers all of the example
trading functions given by equations (3) and (5), whenever 0 ≤ γ < 1.
2.3.2 Path independence
In a manner analogous to the classical market making literature, we will say a CFMM is
path independent if it is path deficient and its reachable reserve set does not change after
any feasible trade that is not dominated by another. In other words, a CFMM with reserves
R is path independent whenever it is path deficient and R′ ∈ S(R) \ dintS(R) implies
S(R′) = S(R). By definition, any path independent CFMM is path deficient, but not
strictly path deficient.
The main reason why path independence simplifies many of the derivations provided is
that, in general, all of its properties can be written only as a function of the reserves the
CFMM has at any one point in time, since no rational agent will ever make a trade such that
the resulting reserves lie in the dominated interior, dint(R), as there would exist a feasible
trade that would have been strictly better for the agent. We will see in the following sections
that this yields a simple approach to finding the marginal price of given assets, among other
cases.
Sufficient condition. A simple sufficient condition for path independence is that the set
T (R) can be written as
T (R) = {(∆,Λ) | ψ(R + ∆− Λ) ≥ ψ(R)}, (7)
where ψ is a nondecreasing quasiconcave function. Since a concave function is quasicon-
cave, this condition is enough to show that all of the example trading functions, given by
equations (3) and (5), are path independent whenever they have no fees (γ = 1).
2.4 Optimal arbitrage and the marginal price
First, we will look at the no-arbitrage conditions for a given CFMM. We will then look at
how these conditions imply a specific marginal price for fixed reserves and then explore some
important special cases for which the marginal prices are easy to write down.
Optimal arbitrage. In the arbitrage problem, we have a reference market of coins i =
1, . . . , n, where each can be sold or purchased at some fixed price given by ci > 0 for each
coin i. In this problem, an agent (usually called an arbitrageur) is allowed to borrow ∆i of
coin i for i = 1, . . . , n and use it to trade with both the reference market and the CFMM,
with the only condition that the loan is repaid at the end of the trade. The optimal arbitrage
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problem then asks what is the optimal arbitrage trade; i.e., what is the optimal value of the
problem
maximize cT (Λ−∆)
subject to (∆,Λ) ∈ T (R), (8)
with variables ∆,Λ ∈ Rn, where R specifies the current reserves of the CFMM at the time
the trade is to be performed. An equivalent formulation in terms of the reachable set is
maximize cT (R−R′)
subject to R′ ∈ S(R), (9)
with variable R′ ∈ Rn. The equivalence follows by noting that we can write R′ = R+ ∆−Λ
and there exists such a (∆,Λ) ∈ T (R) if, and only if, R′ ∈ S(R), by definition. Additionally,
note that any optimal point for (9) will always have R′ ∈ S(R) \ dintS(R).
Because both problems are convex problems, it is almost always the case that they can be
efficiently solved whenever the set T (R) can be compactly expressed in terms of well-known
convex sets. Additionally, the optimality conditions of problem (9) imply that there exists
a supporting hyperplane for the set S(R) with slope collinear to c at the optimal point R′?.
(For more details, see Corollary 11.5.2 and Theorem 18.8 of [44].)
Path deficiency. In general, it may be possible that solving problem (9) and executing the
optimal trade provided is actually not the best possible strategy for a specific arbitrageur.
For example, it may be the case that an arbitrageur could somehow have a higher-payoff
strategy by breaking up the trade into many smaller trades and performing some complicated
trading procedure that results in a better payoff.
In this case, the idea of path deficiency is extraordinarily useful: if a CFMM is path
deficient, then there is no strategy by which an arbitrageur could have higher payoff than
simply solving problem (8) or (9) and executing the resulting trade. Additionally, if the
CFMM is strictly path deficient, then the arbitrageur only does worse by attempting to
subdivide the resulting trades.
To show this, we will consider any strategy {Ri}mi=0 such that the ith action taken by the
arbitrageur changes the reserves from Ri to Ri+1 and is feasible, i.e., Ri+1 ∈ S(Ri). Now,
by definition, the price paid by the agent during the ith action is equal to cT (Ri − Ri+1).
Summing over the prices implies that the total payoff of this strategy is equal to cT (R0−Rm).
Since the CFMM is path deficient, the reachable reserve sets satisfy S(Rm−1) ⊆ · · · ⊆ S(R0),
so Rm ∈ S(R0), which implies that this strategy cannot have higher payoff than the optimal
value of (9), since the strategy taking R0 to Rm in one step is feasible for (9) and has the
same payoff.
The case where the CFMM is strictly path deficient is rather similar. If the number of
moves taken satisfies m > 1, then clearly Rm ∈ dintS(R0) ⊆ S(R0). But, by definition, Rm
is in the dominated interior only when there exists a trade R′ ∈ S(R0) which dominates Rm.
Because R′ is feasible for (9), then the optimal value of problem (9) must be strictly larger
than the payoff for the original m-step strategy. This, in turn, implies that m = 1 and the
resulting problem reduces exactly to (9).
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Figure 4: Reported prices for an example CFMM.
Reported price. The optimality conditions for problem (9) suggest a simple definition for
the prices that should be reported by the CFMM, at some reserves R′: the CFMM should
report the slope of the supporting hyperplane of S(R) at the point R′, scaled appropriately
by the nume´raire. In other words, if g ∈ Rn is a supporting hyperplane of S(R) at R′, then
the reported price should be λg for some λ ≥ 0.
The scaling constant exists since the choice of nume´raire is always left to the CFMM
designer and does not change the optimality conditions. For example, if coin 1 is chosen as
the nume´raire, then the designer would choose λ = 1/g1 and the CFMM would then report
g/g1 as the prices of all coins, such that the reported price of coin 1 is always (g/g1)1 = 1,
as desired.
We also note that there may be many supporting hyperplanes of S(R) at any one point
(cf., g2 and g2
′
at reserves (1, 1) in figure 4) in which case there are many no-arbitrage prices
implied by these reserves and no unique price can be reported. For example, if there exist
two supporting hyperplanes with slopes g and g′, then any convex combination of g and g′
is also a supporting hyperplane and therefore a valid price. For convenience, we will assume
that all such prices are reported, though this need not be true in practice.
Discussion. By reporting the price at the optimality conditions of the optimal arbitrage
problem, we have essentially resolved two issues in one.
First, the definition of the reported prices implies that, given a reference market with
prices equal to c ∈ Rn+, an arbitrageur is always incentivized to make any one of the prices
reported by the CFMM equal to c, since any other trade is strictly suboptimal. In other
words, if the price of the CFMM is mismatched to that of a reference market, an agent is
able to make what is essentially ‘free money’ by only trading between these markets, which,
in turn, would correct the price reported by the CFMM to be the same as the reference
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market price.
Second, unlike the reported price, there is no guarantee that a marginal price at one
specific reserve value is well-defined, since the definition of a marginal price requires the
existence of arbitrarily small trades. (One simple example where a marginal price might not
exist is to consider any CFMM that requires a fixed, nonzero amount of input before any
trade is accepted.) On the other hand, if the CFMM is path independent, then the reported
price and the marginal price will always match exactly. We show a proof in §A.2.
Special cases. The reported price can be easily computed in the common case where the
trading set can be written in the form of (7), in which case the reachable set is constant
after any optimal trade since every optimal trade is never in the dominated interior, which,
in turn, implies that an optimal trade always leaves the reachable set unchanged by the
definition of path independence. We can then use (7) to write the reachable sets as
S(R) = S(R0) = {R′ ∈ Rn | ψ(R′) ≥ ψ(R0)},
for any R ∈ S(R0) \ dintS(R0), where R0 are the reserves of the CFMM before the trade
was completed. In this case, the first order optimality conditions of (9) would imply that
c ∈ λ∂ψ(R′?),
where ∂ψ(R′?) are the subgradients of the function ψ at R′?, that are, by definition, support-
ing hyperplanes of the epigraph of ψ (see [44, §23]). Here, λ ≥ 0 acts as a scaling constant
and depends on the choice of nume´raire.
If ψ is differentiable, then we would instead have (see Theorem 25.1 of [44]),
c = λ∇ψ(R′?),
so the reported prices of this CFMM at some reserves R are simply proportional to ∇ψ(R).
In general, when the trading set of a CFMM can be written in the form of (7), we would
expect the function ψ to be differentiable since this case corresponds to the existence of
exactly one possible price that can be reported for some reserves R.
Practical examples. In the case of constant mean markets (e.g., Balancer), given the
reserves R, we can very easily give the reported prices in the fee-less case. In this case, note
that, from (3),
ψ(R) =
n∏
i=1
Rwii ,
so, after taking the gradient, we have:
(∇ψ(R))j = wj
Rj
n∏
i=1
Rwii =
wj
Rj
ψ(R).
16
Therefore, the price of some coin j with respect to some second coin k corresponds to choosing
coin k as the nume´raire, i.e., choosing λ = 1/(∇ψ(R))k, we get
λ(∇ψ(R))j = (∇ψ(R))j
(∇ψ(R))k =
wj/Rj
wk/Rk
.
And, because γ = 1, the CFMM is path independent, the reported price is equal to the
marginal price. Note that this result is equal to the original derivation of the marginal price
given in the Balancer whitepaper [8, Eq. 7], though it is considerably more concise to derive
using this formalism.
It is also not difficult to derive the prices that the Curve CFMM should report. From (5),
ψ(R) = α1TR− β
(
n∏
i=1
Ri
)−1
,
so
(∇ψ(R))j = α + β
(
Rj
n∏
i=1
Ri
)−1
,
and, taking coin k as the nume´raire, we find the price of coin j as,
(∇ψ(R))j
(∇ψ(R))k =
α + β (Rj
∏n
i=1Ri)
−1
α + β (Rk
∏n
i=1Ri)
−1 .
2.5 Liquidity providers and returns
An important aspect of CFMMs is the ability for liquidity providers, as described in §2,
to add or remove value from the reserves. Because liquidity providers own some explicit
percentage of the total amount of coins in reserves, we consider what the current value of
the CFMM’s total reserves are, under the same assumptions of §2.4: that (a) there exists an
external, infinitely liquid reference market and (b) there exists an arbitrageur who is solving
the arbitrage problem. The total value in the reserves is then proportional to the value of
the position a liquidity provider has, with respect to the CFMM (where the proportionality
constant is simply the percentage of the reserves that a liquidity provider is entitled to).
Value in reserves. By definition, the total value of all assets held in reserves, R, by the
CFMM is simply cTR, where ci > 0 is the price of currency i given by a reference market.
To say what the total value of the reserves is, note that problem (9) is equivalent to the
following problem:
minimize cTR′
subject to R′ ∈ S(R), (10)
with variable R′ ∈ Rn, in the sense that an optimal R′ for (9) is optimal for (10) and vice
versa. We can see this since the term cTR in the objective of (9) is a constant in the problem,
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and we’ve simply switched maximizing a function with minimizing its negative. Since this
is true, then the optimal value of (10) is exactly the total value of the reserves.
Throughout the remainder of this section, we will let p?R(c) be the optimal value of
problem (10) for a given cost vector c and fixed reserves R. We also note that the function
p?R(c) can be recognized as the negative of the support function of the set S(R) [44, §13].
Path deficiency. An important consequence of path deficiency with respect to the total
reserve value is that, in general, the total value of the reserves never decreases for a fixed
cost vector. In particular, if R are the reserves at some (initial point) and R′ are the reserves
at some future point (after any number of trades have been performed), then, by definition
of path deficiency, we have S(R′) ⊆ S(R). This immediately implies that p?R′(c) ≥ p?R(c),
since problem (10) with reserves R contains all of the same feasible points of problem (10)
with reserves R′, so its optimal value can be no higher. It is not difficult to prove that strict
path deficiency implies that this value is, instead, strictly increasing—the idea follows from
the fact that all optimal points of (10) with reserves R will always lie in S(R) \ S(R′) and
that S(R′) is a closed set.
The dual function. If we can write the reachable reserve set as,
S(R) = {R′ ∈ Rn | ψ(R′) ≥ ψ(R)},
for some quasiconcave, increasing function ψ, then the Lagrangian [42, §5.1.1] of problem (10)
is
L(R′, λ) = cTR′ − λ(ψ(R′)− ψ(R)),
which lets us write the dual function g(λ) = infR′ L(R′, λ) for λ ≥ 0. This function, written
in terms of ψ is
g(λ) = λψ(R) + inf
R′
(
cTR′ − λψ(R′))
= λψ(R)− sup
R′
(
(−c)TR′ − λ(−ψ)(R′)) .
If λ > 0, we have that the last term is equal to
sup
R′
(
(−c)TR′ − λ(−ψ)(R′))
= λ sup
R′
(
(−c/λ)TR′ − (−ψ)(R′)) = λ (−ψ)∗ (− c
λ
)
,
where (−ψ)∗ is the Fenchel conjugate [42, §3.3] of −ψ and is known for a very large number of
convex functions. We also note that this operation is just the perspective transform of (−ψ)∗
(sometimes called epi-multiplication [44, §5]) and is well defined even when λ = 0, though
we will continue to write the term as is for simplicity. Combining the resulting statements,
we get
g(λ) = λψ(R)− λ (−ψ)∗
(
− c
λ
)
,
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for λ ≥ 0.
By weak duality [42, §5.2.2], we know that supλ≥0 g(λ) ≤ p?R(c), so picking any λ ≥ 0
will suffice to give a lower bound on the total value of the reserves. Additionally, since ψ is
strictly monotonic, then strong duality holds [42, §5.2.3] and we have that
p?R(c) = sup
λ≥0
g(λ) = sup
λ≥0
(
λψ(R)− λ (−ψ)∗
(
− c
λ
))
, (11)
instead. This construction gives us a way of computing total reserve values by solving a
single-variable convex optimization problem (since g is always a convex function [42, §5.1.2])
and, in some important cases, gives closed form expressions for the total reserve value.
Constant mean reserve values. Using the constant mean trade function with γ = 1,
given in (3), we can write
ψ(R) =
n∏
i=1
Rwii .
We will write, for convenience, k = ψ(R0) at the initial reserves R0. Note that, since this
CFMM is path independent, the reachable reserve set does not change and we may assume
that the reachable reserve set is simply S(R) = {R′ ∈ Rn | ψ(R′) ≥ k} for any reachable
reserves R.
From [42, prob. 3.36], we have that, for any cost vector c ∈ Rn+:
(−ψ)∗(−c) =
{
0
∏n
i=1 c
wi
i ≥ 1/n
∞ otherwise.
As before, the current value of the reserves is given by (11):
sup
λ≥0
(
λk − λ (−ψ)∗
(
− c
λ
))
.
Now, note that
λk − λ (−ψ)∗
(
− c
λ
)
=
{
λk (
∏
i c
wi
i ) /λ ≥ 1/n
−∞ otherwise,
which we can easily maximize by choosing the largest possible λ, i.e., λ = n
∏
i c
wi
i , since
k > 0, yielding
sup
λ≥0
(
λk − λ (−ψ)∗
(
− c
λ
))
= nk
n∏
i=1
cwii . (12)
Using the special case of n = 2 and w1 = w2 = 1/2, we can recover the total reserve
value of Uniswap with zero fees, derived via a different method in [33, §2.3]. To see this, set
c1 = 1 (i.e., coin 1 is the nume´raire) such that c2 is the market price of coin 2 with respect
to coin 1. Then, we can write the total value in reserves as,
p? = 2k
√
c2,
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where the square root difference between the expression in [33, §2.3] and this one comes from
the fact that k here is the square root of the product constant, i.e., k =
√
R1R2. (See [33,
§3].)
Lower bounds for Curve. We suspect that there is no analytical solution to the total
reserve value for the Curve CFMM, given in (5). We will, instead, derive some lower bounds
to the total reserve value by appropriately choosing λ ≥ 0, where the function we consider is
ψ(R) = α1TR− β
(
n∏
i=1
Ri
)−1
,
which means the CFMM’s reachable set is S(R) = {R ∈ Rn | ψ(R) ≥ k}, where k = ψ(R0)
and this CFMM is path independent.
First, for λ ≥ 0,
λ(−ψ)∗
(
− c
λ
)
= −(n+ 1)(λβ)1/(n+1)
n∏
i=1
(ci − λα)1/(n+1),
if ci − λα ≥ 0 for each i = 1, . . . , n and +∞, otherwise (see §A.3). The dual function,
g : R→ R, is then
g(λ) = λk + (n+ 1)(λβ)1/(n+1)
n∏
i=1
(ci − λα)1/(n+1),
if ci − λα ≥ 0 for each i = 1, . . . , n and −∞, otherwise. Some simple lower bounds come
from considering λ as large as possible, which is somewhat tight if k is very large relative
to (β
∏n
i=1 ci)
1/(n+1). We can do this by choosing λ = mini ci/α, giving the following lower
bound for the total reserve value:
p?R(c) ≥
(
k
α
)
min
i
ci.
Though we suspect that, in general, the exact value of p?R(c) cannot be given in closed form,
we note that the resulting problem of optimizing g is a one-parameter convex optimization
problem that is, in practice, easy to solve numerically.
3 Extensions and future work
There are several important applications and essentially immediate extensions of the current
conditions and definitions that are interesting to study in their own right. We discuss some
basic examples here.
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3.1 Trading fees
We can easily introduce trading fees to any given CFMM. A simple but effective approach is
to introduce fees on the input trade. Given a trading function ϕ for a CFMM, we can then
write a new trading function ϕf with some fee constant 0 < γ ≤ 1 defined as
ϕf (R,∆,Λ) = ϕ(R, γ∆,Λ),
for all reserves R, inputs ∆, and outputs Λ where (1 − γ) is the percentage fee required.
Equivalently, we can write this in terms of a new trading set Tf (R) as
Tf (R) = {(∆,Λ) | (γ∆,Λ) ∈ T (R)},
for each reserve R.
In this case, the trader is required to put in 1/γ more of input ∆ for a trade to be feasible.
Additionally, this will turn path independent CFMMs into path deficient ones (strictly path
deficient, if γ < 1). Because the resulting CFMM is path deficient, this method also has the
nice property that the total reserve values are always bounded from below by the solution
to (10).
There are several more possible methods, some of which may include variable input
and/or output fees which vary in such a way as to keep other desirable properties of the
CFMMs on a case-to-case basis. We suspect that there are many approaches for charging
trading fees, each with their own useful properties, but leave the possibility of finding a
suitable class of these trading fees that is good to study for future work.
3.2 Comparison to scoring rules
While it is tempting to ask about potential comparisons or equivalences to classic algorithmic
game theory automated market makers and scoring rules such as Hanson’s LMSR, we note
that this is likely not possible using only the no-arbitrage framework used in this paper. A
simple thought experiment shows why this might be the case.
Given an infinitely liquid reference market with a fixed price p1 from time [0, T ), where
T > 0, and price p2 > p1 at time T (known by all agents), then the reported price of a
prediction market which seeks to predict the price of the asset at time T and the reported
price of a given CFMM will always diverge by p2 − p1. Rational agents will always be
incentivized to correctly report the (known) future price p2 for the prediction market, while
arbitrageurs will always make positive payoff from any CFMM which diverges from the
current market price p1 at all times [0, T ), by setting the reported price to be p1. Sending
p2 − p1 →∞ then shows that these two AMMs can diverge by any desired amount.
The idea here is that any framework which can compare the two will require assumptions
about the market price dynamics, i.e., what the current market price might say about the
future market price, which we do not assume at any point in this presentation. We leave this
potentially very interesting research avenue of finding a suitable framework for comparison
for future work.
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3.3 Optimization over possible CFMMs
Note that the given conditions define a family of CFMMs which are likely to be useful in
practice. This implies that, for any performance metric (e.g., average total reserve value
for a given market model) that a market maker designer wishes to optimize, one could
find an (approximately) optimal CFMM to accomplish this task. The problem is likely to be
computationally difficult to solve exactly in most important cases, but we suspect that many
commonly-used heuristics will likely find good results. Though this approach is unlikely to
be feasible except when n is small, we imagine that the very useful case of n = 2 can be
quickly optimized on modern hardware for many useful performance metrics.
Additionally, if the trading function ϕ is parametrized by a small number of parameters
(for example, the parameters α, β in (5)), it is possible to at least approximately optimize
these parameters to maximize or minimize some desired objective function of the trading
sets or the reachable sets.
3.4 Time-dependent CFMMs and other generalizations
Note that the conditions and definitions above can be very easily extended to the cases
where the trading function ϕ depends on exogenous variables such as time. In particular,
we may assume that arbitrage happens instantaneously or nearly instantaneously. This, in
turn, would imply that some (but not all) of our analysis on general CFMMs holds even in
this scenario.
There are still several interesting questions to answer in this case. One such question is:
what is a natural generalization of the reachable set when the trading function (or, equiva-
lently, the reachable set) is also time-dependent? A simple (but likely woefully incomplete)
answer is that, if the reachable set depends on time, say St(R), where t ≥ 0 is a time variable,
we additionally have St′(R) ⊆ St(R) for all R and t′ ≥ t. This retains some of the given
properties, such as the lower bounds on the total reserve values given in (11), but is likely
to be too strong of a condition to be useful in practice.
Another natural question is, are there good restrictions on how liquidity providers should
add liquidity to reserves? One could imagine that, in some scenarios, allowing agents to add
coins to reserves in an arbitrary way could lead to large losses for liquidity providers. An
even more fundamental question, which we do not cover at all is: can liquidity provision
easily be included in a similar framework? We suspect so, but even this is not clear at the
moment and is likely to be a good avenue for future exploration.
4 Conclusion
The increase in usage and participation in automated market makers has led to a vast set of
new scoring rules and pricing mechanisms. Analyzing these mechanisms, which range from
LMSR style market makers and CFMMs to scoring rules for rates [45], from the perspective
of optimization provides insight into why certain mechanisms are more popular than others
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and work well in practice. In particular, we show that CFMMs provide an easy optimization
problem for arbitrageurs to synchronize off-chain and on-chain pricing data, along with
several useful conditions that often hold in practice, which imply that CFMMs are likely to
be very well behaved. This generalization encompasses all live CFMMs [7, 8, 31, 39] and
provides guidance on how one can design CFMMs that are better for certain asset types and
volatilities.
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A Miscellaneous Proofs
A.1 An equivalent monotonic trade function
Given some trade function ϕ, we will write an equivalent CFMM with trading function
ϕ′(R, ·, ·) that is monotonically nonincreasing in its first argument and monotonically non-
decreasing in its second, for each possible reserves R.
First, define the squared distance-to-set function for some set U ⊆ Rn and point x ∈ Rn
as
d(x, U) = inf
y∈U
‖x− y‖22.
Then the following function
ϕ′(R,∆,Λ) = d((∆,Λ), T (R)) + d(0, T (R)),
suffices. In this case, ϕ′(R, ·, ·) measures the squared distance of a given trade to the trade
set, with some offset given by d(0, T (R)).
Equivalence. First, if ϕ′(R,∆,Λ) = ϕ′(R, 0, 0) then we have that d((∆,Λ), T (R)) = 0
so (∆,Λ) ∈ T (R), since T (R) is a closed set. Conversely, if ϕ′(R,∆,Λ) 6= ϕ′(R, 0, 0) then
ϕ′(R,∆,Λ) > ϕ′(R, 0, 0) since the squared distance function is nonnegative, which means
d((∆,Λ), T (R)) > 0 and, in turn, that (∆,Λ) 6∈ T (R). This implies that the function ϕ′ has
trading set T (R) and is therefore equivalent to ϕ. (As a second useful note, if the set T (R)
is convex, then ϕ′(R, ·, ·) is also convex in its arguments [42, §3.2.5].)
Monotonicity. Note that, since monotonicity is defined elementwise, it suffices to prove
monotonicity for general sets Q ⊆ R×Rn of the form
Q = {(t, q) | (t′, q) ∈ W for some t′ ≤ t},
for some nonempty closed set W ⊆ R×Rn. (Note that the set Q is closed if the set W is.)
We will show that the squared distance-to-set function, d(·, Q), is decreasing with respect
to the first element of its first argument. Consider some pair (t, q) ∈ R × Rn and let
(t?, q?) ∈ R×Rn minimize d(t, q), which exists since the set is closed. Now, for any t′ ∈ R
with t′ ≥ t, either t′ ≥ t?, in which case
d(t′, q) ≤ ‖q − q?‖22 ≤ d(t, q)
since (t′, q?) ∈ Q by definition of Q, or t′ < t?, which implies that t ≤ t′ < t? so clearly,
d(t′, q) ≤ (t′ − t?)2 + ‖q − q?‖22 < (t− t?)2 + ‖q − q?‖22 = d(t, q),
which shows that d(t′, q) ≤ d(t, q) for every t′ ≥ t.
The complete proof then follows from the fact that we can apply this proof elementwise
to the function ϕ′(R, ·, ·).
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Discussion. In general, the fact that we can always write a monotonic trade function for
any trade set implies that problem (8) and the following ‘relaxed’ problem are equivalent
(for fixed reserves R),
minimize cT (Λ−∆)
subject to ϕ′(R,∆,Λ) ≤ 0. (13)
Here, the variables are Λ,∆ ∈ Rn and the problem data are R and c.
To see this, first note that, any trade (∆,Λ) that is feasible for problem (8) is clearly
feasible for this problem since, by definition of ϕ′, ϕ′(R,∆,Λ) = 0, so the optimal objective
value is no larger than that of (8). Additionally, no optimal point (∆?,Λ?) for problem (13)
will ever satisfy ϕ′(∆?,Λ?) < 0. We can see this since the function ϕ′ is continuous, which
implies that the set of all (∆,Λ) satisfying ϕ′(∆,Λ) < 0 is an open set. This, in turn,
implies that, for any trade (∆,Λ) satisfying ϕ′(∆,Λ) < 0 there always exists a trade (∆′,Λ′)
satisfying ∆′ < ∆ and Λ′ > Λ (since there always exists such a pair (∆′,Λ′) in some
neighborhood around (∆,Λ)) which clearly has strictly lower objective value, so (∆,Λ)
cannot be optimal for (13). So, ϕ′(R,∆?,Λ?) = 0 and, therefore, that we also have (∆?,Λ?) ∈
T (R), so any optimal point for (13) is also feasible for (8), implying that both problems have
the same optimal value.
Because ϕ′(R, ·, ·) is convex if T (R) is, then problem (13) is additionally a convex opti-
mization problem whenever T (R) is convex.
A.2 Marginal price for path independent CFMMs
First, we define the price of performing a trade as the minimal cost of receiving a desired
output of Λ, where the value of coin i is given by ci > 0:
p(R, c,Λ) = inf{cT∆ | R + ∆− Λ ∈ S(R)}. (14)
Now, under the scenario given in problem (9), we have that the reported price, c is a
supporting hyperplane of S(R) at the point R′ = R+ ∆?−Λ? where (∆?,Λ?) is the optimal
arbitrage trade, and that S(R′) = S(R), since the CFMM is path independent. We can then
define the marginal price of a desired output Λ, after the optimal trade is completed, as the
limit:
lim
ε↓0
p(R′, c, εΛ)
ε
.
By definition, since c is a supporting hyperplane of S(R) at R′, we have that
cT (R′′ −R′) ≥ 0, for all R′′ ∈ S(R),
which implies that
cT (∆− Λ) ≥ 0,
for all ∆,Λ satisfying R′ + ∆− Λ ∈ S(R) = S(R′), which can easily be rewritten as cT∆ ≥
cTΛ. Using this inequality with the definition of the marginal price (14), we find:
p(R′, c, εΛ)
ε
≥ 1
ε
(εcTΛ) = cTΛ.
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but the inequality is, in fact, an equality since ∆ = εΛ is a feasible point for (14) as
R′ ∈ S(R) = S(R′). Since the definition of the marginal price of coin i is the average price
of buying an infinitesimally small quantity of coin i; i.e.,
lim
ε↓0
p(R′, c, εei)
ε
= ci,
where ei is the ith unit vector, then the price reported matches the marginal price at reserves
R′, as required.
A.3 Conjugate of reciprocal product
We show here that the convex function given by
f(x) =
(
n∏
i=1
xi
)−1
,
has a Fenchel conjugate given by
f ∗(y) =
{
−(n+ 1) (∏ni=1(−yi))1/(n+1) y ≤ 0
+∞ otherwise.
The proof is mostly mechanical. The definition of the Fenchel conjugate of the function
f is given by
f ∗(y) = sup
x
(yTx− f(x)),
where f(x) is extended in the natural way (i.e., f(x) = +∞ if xi ≤ 0 for any i). First, we
show that if yi > 0 for some i, then f
∗(y) = +∞. To do this, note that we can set xi = t and
xj = 1 for every j with j 6= i. Then sending t→∞, we get that yTx→∞, while f(x)→ 0,
implying the result.
Now we consider the case where y ≤ 0. First, note that, in this case
yTx− f(x) ≤ 0,
for any x, since x > 0 and therefore f(x) ≥ 0 (otherwise, if x 6> 0, we have f(x) = +∞ by
definition, so the claim is always satisfied). Now, if there exists some i with yi = 0, then we
can achieve this bound by setting xi = t
n and xj = 1/t for j 6= i. Sending t→∞ yields the
result since yTx→ 0 and f(x)→ 0.
The remaining case is when y < 0. Here, we can write the first order optimality conditions
over x (which are sufficient and necessary by convexity and differentiability) after some
simplifications:
x?i yi = −
(
n∏
j=1
x?j
)−1
, i = 1, . . . , n,
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or, equivalently, that
x?i
n∏
j=1
x?j =
1
−yi , i = 1, . . . , n.
This implies that x is collinear with the negative reciprocal of y, i.e., that x?i = λ/(−yi),
and, since x? ≥ 0, we must have λ ≥ 0. This implies
λn+1 =
n∏
i=1
(−yi),
and therefore,
x?i =
1
−yi
(
n∏
i=1
(−yi)
) 1
n+1
,
which implies that
yTx? − f(x?) = −(n+ 1)
(
n∏
i=1
(−yi)
) 1
n+1
,
completing the proof.
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